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Abstract
In this paper we examine the differences in use between distal and proximal demonstrative terms (e.g.,
singular “this” and “that”, and plural “these” and “those” in English). The proximal–distal distinction
appears to be made in all languages and therefore promises to be an important window on the cognitive
mechanisms underlying language production and comprehension. We address the problem of accounting
for the distinction through a corpus-based quantitative study of the deictic use of demonstratives in
Dutch. Our study suggests that the distal–proximal distinction corresponds with use of the proximal for
intensive/strong indicating (i.e., directing of attention) and the distal for neutral indicating. We compare
our findings with empirical findings on the use of English demonstratives and argue that, despite some
apparent differences, Dutch and English demonstratives behave roughly similarly though not identically.
Finally, we put our findings into context by pulling together evidence from a number of converging
sources on the relationship between indicating and describing as alternative modes of reference in the
use of distal and proximal demonstratives. This will also lead us to a new understanding of the folk-view
on distals and proximals as distinguishing between nearby and faraway objects.
Keywords: Proximal and distal demonstratives, accessibility, importance, deictic reference
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1 Introduction
In this paper we present an analysis of the use of demonstrative noun phrases, henceforth demonstratives.
Demonstratives can be found across all languages and, more specifically, all languages have at least two
types of demonstrative terms: a demonstrative term roughly expressing that the intended referent is nearby
the speaker and another demonstrative term expressing that the intended referent is faraway from the
speaker (see Diessel, 1999:50). The two alternative forms of demonstratives are known as proximal (also
proximate) and distal; in English, “this/these” and “that/those”, respectively.
The universality of demonstratives and the proximal–distal distinction across languages makes demonstratives
a topic that is of interest beyond the bounds of pure linguistics to the wider field of cognitive science. It is
very unlikely that the proximal-distal distinction is completely arbitrary, given that language communities
across the world have independently from each other arrived at this distinction. This makes it much
more likely that the distinction is grounded in how the human cognitive system represents and processes
information and how these abilities are exploited in language use.
The aim of this paper is to study in detail how the use of distal and proximal demonstratives is grounded
in the cognitive processes that are involved in language comprehension and production. Although linguists
have studied the use of demonstratives extensively, this is an area that is relatively unexplored. For instance,
Diessel (1999:160), who provides an excellent overview of findings on demonstratives for a sample of
85 languages, concedes that “The vast majority of grammars that I consulted use semantic labels such
as ‘proximal’ or ‘near speaker’ in order to characterize meanings of demonstratives. These labels are,
however, only rough approximations. The meaning of a demonstrative is often more complex. It would be
a very interesting project to study semantic values of demonstratives in greater detail.”.
Doing exactly that, we present a quantitative study into the semantic values of demonstratives that are
used for direct reference to objects in a speech situation, henceforth deictic demonstratives. The interest
of deixis from a cognitive point of view has been pointed out by, amongst others, Weissenborn and Klein
(1982:3): “deixis is the domain par excellence where language and reality meet”.
Interestingly, although the deictic use of demonstratives is considered more basic than other uses (see
Diessel 1999 and Levinson 2004), to our knowledge, there are no quantitative studies of this type of use.
Existing studies typically consist of a detailed analysis of a few naturally occurring or constructed instances.
The work of Robert Kirsner on demonstratives in written discourse is a notable exception to the general
lack of quantitative studies. Kirsner studied Dutch demonstratives extensively, using both corpus data and
experiments. His findings have been reported in a series of papers including Kirsner (1979, 1985, 1993)
and Kirsner and Van Heuven (1988). However, whereas Kirsner focused on the use of demonstratives in
written discourse, we are concerned primarily with the deictic use of demonstratives, which refer directly
to objects in the environment of the interlocutors.
In the remainder of this paper, we proceed as follows. Firstly, we introduce some terminology for
characterizing different types of demonstratives. We then review a number of arguments against the
folk-view on proximal and distal demonstratives. According to the folk-view, proximals are used to refer
to objects that are near to the speaker and distals for objects that are faraway from the speaker. In the next
section, we develop a new account of the difference between proximal and distal demonstratives. For this
purpose, we build on the notion of indicating. This notion goes back to C.S. Peirce (Buchler, 1940: chap. 7)
and has, more recently, been expanded upon by Herbert Clark (e.g., Clark 1996; 2004). Roughly speaking,
indicating means directing of attention, which can be achieved by a wide variety of means such as pointing,
ringing a door bell, knocking on a surface, pitch accent, etc. Here, we draw attention to the fact that an act
of indicating can be executed with different degrees of intensity: one can, for instance, knock on a surface
softly, or with considerable force. Building on this notion of intensity of indicating – which is closely
related to Garcı´a’s (1975) distinction between low and high deixis that was first applied to the analysis of
demonstratives by Kirsner (1979) – we put forward our main hypothesis regarding demonstratives that are
accompanied by a pointing (i.e., indicating) act: proximals are used for intense indicating and distals for
neutral indicating. The hypothesis is fleshed out by two sub-hypotheses which link intense indicating with
low accessibility and high importance (of the object which the speaker is referring to). The next section
describes how we collected a corpus of data on the use of deictic demonstratives and tested our hypotheses
on these data. We found that low accessibility is indeed correlated with intense indicating. No evidence
was, however, found for the relation between intense indicating and high importance. The penultimate
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section of this paper compares our findings on Dutch with those on English demonstratives and puts the
findings in a wider context; whereas the emphasis so far has been on the use of demonstratives for reference
through indicating, in this section, we also consider how demonstratives are used for describing. For
comparison, we consider the standard analysis of the role of describing in definite descriptions. We draw
on a variety of evidence –including findings from diachronic studies– to provide the outline of a systematic
treatment of the relation between indicating, describing and demonstratives. The aim of this section is to
stimulate discussion and suggest further lines of observational and experimental inquiry. We will also shed
some light on why the folk-view of demonstratives has remained unchallenged for so long. We end the
paper with a conclusion section.
2 Form and Use of Demonstratives
We will speak of a demonstrative noun phrase, or demonstrative, if the noun phrase contains a demonstrative
term –e.g., singular “this” and “that”, and plural “these” and “those” in English– functioning either as a
determiner or as a demonstrative pronoun constituting the full noun phrase.
The predominant use of demonstratives is as definite referring expressions.1 In that role they are used to
identify a referent in the surroundings of the interlocutors, or the addressee’s mental/memory representation
of a referent. Consider the following example:
(1) that green one with four holes
This expression consists of a demonstrative determiner (“that”) and two modifiers (“green” and “with
four holes”). The two modifiers present properties of the referent: its colour and shape. These properties
can help the addressee to identify the referent. The identificational role of descriptive content in referring
expressions is widely acknowledged and believed to be the predominant role. Non-identificational uses of
descriptive content do, however, exist: for example, occasionally, speakers include descriptive content in
order to trigger task-related inferences, as in the use of “the £200 purple vase”, where inclusion of £200 is
not intended to aid identification, but is relevant in some way to the current purpose of the conversation,
e.g., whether to buy the vase (see, e.g., Jordan 2000).
We distinguish between demonstratives that are used anaphorically/cataphorically and those that are
used deictically. An anaphoric/cataphoric demonstrative is co-referential with a linguistic expression that
precedes/succeeds it (the antecedent) and is dependent on this antecedent for its interpretation (cf. Carter.
1987), while a deictic demonstrative refers directly to the extra-linguistic context, e.g., physical objects,
times or events. We follow Biber et al. (1999), who distinguish between situational, time, anaphoric and
cataphoric reference; however, we group situational and time reference under the label deictic reference.2
Deictic demonstratives are often accompanied by pointing gestures.
The anaphoric use of demonstratives in written discourse is illustrated by the following fragment from
a book on the history of mathematics (Hollingdale, 1989:19–20):
1There is, however, also a use of demonstratives which is sometimes characterized as indefinite. An example of this use occurs
in the following sentence: “This guy I met yesterday almost sold me his car”. Here, a new person (“This guy”) is introduced into
the discourse. The addressee is not presumed to be familiar in any way with this person. This type of use is beyond the scope of the
current paper which focuses on demonstratives as definite referring expressions.
2Some have used the same terminology in a different way, e.g., Diessel (1999) classifies some instances of what we would call
anaphoric demonstratives as discourse deictic demonstratives. For instance, ‘this’ in example 2 is considered discourse deictic because
it refers to a proposition rather than the referent of a noun phrase. This is in contrast with our approach according to which what
matters for determining whether a reference is anaphoric is whether the reference proceeds via the linguistic context or not.
Our position is that taking discourse deictic demonstratives as a separate category gives rise to two complications which are
better avoided. Firstly, it is not possible to consistently distinguish between antecedents that refer to propositions, events, etc. and
antecedents that are realized by noun phrases, since some noun phrases refer to events, proposition, etc. Take “this conquest” in the
following discourse: “The conquest of Pasam in 1802 was a swift one and consequently this conquest involved only little loss of
life.”. The noun phrase ‘this conquest’ refers to an event which is the referent of a noun phrase (“The conquest of Pasam in 1802”).
Additionally, propositional non-nominal antecedents P can be easily transformed into nominal antecedents by means of the schema
‘The proposition that P ’. Diessel’s (1999:103) table 62, which summarizes his scheme, does not tell us what to do with such unusual
but nevertheless nominal antecedents. Secondly, Diessel (1999:103) is forced to speak about “cataphoric” and ‘anaphoric discourse
deictic demonstratives’ to distinguish between dependence on the preceding versus the succeeding linguistic context. This also shows
that under this interpretation the terms anaphoric and discourse deictic overlap and therefore do not identify mutually exclusive types
of use of demonstratives.
4
Final draft of: Piwek et al. (2007). In: Journal of Pragmatics. Electronically published June 27 2007. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2007.05.001  
(2) If p and q are decomposed into their prime factors, then each factor will appear twice in the factorizations
of p2 and q2. This means that the left side of the equation p2 = 2q2 will consist of an even number
of factors, and the right side of an odd number of factors.
In this text fragment, a pronominal demonstrative (“This”) is used anaphorically, i.e., the demonstrative
has a linguistic antecedent. The linguistic antecedent in question is the entire first sentence of the text
fragment. This antecedent expresses a proposition.
The next example consists of a fragment of naturally occurring task-oriented dialogue. The fragment
was taken from the Dutch corpus that we study in this paper and for which the transcripts can be found in
(Cremers, 1993). The dialogue from which this fragment was taken involves two interlocutors, a builder
(B) and an instructor (I), who are solving a task in a block world. The actual Dutch wording (in italics) is
followed by a word-by-word translation into English and a colloquial or “loose” translation. Furthermore,
pauses of N seconds are represented by “. . . (N)” and “+ր” indicates a concurrent pointing act. We follow
these conventions throughout the paper.
(3) I: Ja.
Yes.
Yes.
En nou dat gele blokje daar rechtsvoor,
And now that yellow block there rightfront,
And now that yellow block in the front to the right,
B: Deze? +ր
This? +ր
This one? +ր
I: Dat moet ook weg.
That must also away.
That one has to go too.
Dat moet worden vervangen door een blauwe.
That must be replaced by a blue.
That one has to be replaced by a blue one.
B: . . . (2.2) Zo?
. . . (2.2) Like this?
. . . (2.2) This way?
This dialogue fragment contains two examples of deictically used demonstratives followed by two anaphoric
uses (Cremers, 1993:16):3 Note that in Dutch there are separate demonstrative terms for common gender
(proximal “deze” and distal “die”) and neuter gender (proximal “dit” and distal “dat”).
Referring expressions, such as demonstratives, convey information beyond their descriptive content by
means of the linguistic type: when speakers formulate a referring expression they have to choose from a
range of alternative types of noun phrase, including personal pronouns, definite descriptions, names, distal
demonstratives and proximal demonstratives. Here we concentrate on factors that influence the choice
between a proximal and a distal demonstrative.
The labels proximal and distal reflect the traditional analysis of the two term opposition as linguistically
codifying the spatial concepts of nearby and faraway. Such a spatial interpretation of demonstratives is
associated with their paradigmatic use for identifying objects that are located in the spatial environment of
the interlocutors (e.g., Clark & Marshall, 1981) and can be found in entries for the terms “this” and “that”
in dictionaries for both English and Dutch.4
The traditional account would be particularly attractive if it could be shown that the way people
linguistically divide space into nearby and faraway is grounded in our visual encoding of space. Kemmerer
(1999), however, extensively argues against this possibility. Kemmerer reviews the literature on the neurologically
3The third and fourth demonstrative depend on the preceding linguistic context for their interpretation.
4E.g., “that [...] 2. the farther away or less immediately under observation <this chair or ∼ one>” (Longman Dictionary of the
English Language, 1991); “de’ze [...] dit of deze voor nabij zijnde; die, dat of gene voor meer verwijderde zaken; [...]” (this [...] this
[neuter gender] or this [common gender] for the close by; that [common gender], that [neuter gender] or that one, for more distant
things) (Van Dale: Groot Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal, 1984: volume A–I).
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grounded perceptual distinction between nearby and faraway and points out that that distinction is concrete
and quantitative: we have a perceptual system geared towards objects within our arms’ reach which helps
with manipulating and avoiding objects and a separate system for objects that are further away and helps
with identifying and analyzing objects with the eyes. Kemmerer then points out that (qualitative) data from
various crosslinguistic studies show that the linguistic distinction between nearby and faraway is quite
different. In particular, it is not constrained by the range of the speaker’s or hearer’s arms.
Findings along the same lines as those reported in Kemmerer (1999) can be found in Enfield (2003).
Enfield carried out a field study into the use of the Lao demonstrative determiners “nii” and “nan” and
concludes “neither [of the demonstrative terms] encodes information about distance, and only one encodes
information about location” (Enfield, 2003:115). Enfield proposes that the two demonstratives are ordered
in terms of generality, with “nii” being more general than “nan”, and the latter having the specific semantic
content of ‘not here’. ‘Here’ space, according to Enfield, is essentially contextual and interactional: it
is influenced by a variety of factors including visibility and access. Enfield argues against identifying the
contextual and interactional factors that determine ‘here’ space with the semantic content of the demonstrative
terms; according to him the semantic content itself is simple, and nevertheless gives rise to wide variety of
uses depending on the contextual/interactional realization of the ‘here’ space.
Hence, the nearby–faraway analysis is less promising than it looks at first sight. Some data from Dutch
also brings home its limited applicability. Consider the following dialogue fragment, which is discussed in
Janssen (1993, p. 768), and takes place in a situation where a doctor is palpating a patient.
(4) Doctor: Doet het zeer op deze plek?
Does it hurt on this place?
Is this where it hurts?
Patient: Ja, op die plek.
Yes, on that place.
Yes, that is where it hurts.
In this example, the referent (the place where it hurts) is strictly speaking closest to the patient (it is a
part of the patient), and yet it is the doctor who uses the proximal form and the patient who uses the distal
form.
3 Referring with Demonstratives: A Cognitive Model
In the previous section, we have seen that the intuitively attractive spatial analysis of the distal–proximal
opposition may not be the best foundation for studying the differences between the use of proximal and
distal demonstratives. In this section, we introduce an alternative grounding in terms of the cognitive
notions of indicating, accessibility and importance.
3.1 Two Modes of Reference: Describing and Indicating
Our starting point is C.S. Peirce’s (Buchler, 1940) theory of signs. Signs are characterized as relating to
an object and an interpretant: a sign stands for its object and creates in the mind of the addressee an idea,
which Peirce calls the interpretant. For example, a statue of Queen Victoria stands for a particular person,
i.e., Queen Victoria, and creates in the mind of the onlooker an idea of the person that the statue portrays.
Peirce divides signs into icons, indices and symbols. The distinction rests on the way in which the sign is
connected to its object. Icons resemble their object. Thus, the statue of Queen Victoria is an icon. Symbols
are related to their object by convention. The object of a symbol is not an individual thing, but rather a type
of thing. For example, the word “cup” is a symbol: it stands for a particular type of objects, i.e., cups, and
not for one specific object. Finally, indices are spatially, causally or temporally connected to their object.
For example, a thermometer is an index because it is causally connected to the temperature, and a pointing
finger is an index because it is spatially related to the object which it is pointing at. According to Peirce,
indices are used for “[directing] the attention to their objects by blind compulsion. [...] Psychologically,
the action of indices depends upon association by contiguity and not upon association by resemblance or
upon intellectual operations.” (Buchler, 1940:108). Recent research on pointing gestures characterizes
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these along the same lines: “Pointing is a deictic gesture used to reorient the attention of another person so
that an object becomes the shared focus for attention.” (Butterworth, 2003:9)
Clark (1996:160) extends Peirce’s work by defining a signal as “the presentation of a sign by one
person to mean something for another”. For each type of sign, Clark introduces terms for the corresponding
method of signaling: icons are used for demonstrating, symbols for describing and indices for indicating.
In this paper, we are interested in how signs are used to refer to an object. For indices and icons, this is
straightforward: when a speaker presents an index or icon to an addressee, the speaker is thereby referring
to the object which the index or icon stands for. For symbols, there is a complication: we have seen that
symbols stand for types of things, rather than individual objects. Nevertheless, combinations of symbols
can be used for referring to individual objects. For example, one specific use of a definite description
such as “the green block” is to uniquely identify an object that is green and block-shaped from the set of
contextually given objects. In other words, the speaker refers to an object by describing it as green and
block-shaped. In specific contexts, the definite article can license such an interpretation of a noun phrase
as designating a unique identifiable referent that satisfies the descriptive content of the noun phrase – note
that this is by no means the only interpretation that the definite article can give rise to; e.g., Epstein (2002)
describes other uses of the definite article and proposes that the basic meaning of the definite article is
that of signalling ‘to the addressee the availability of an “access path” [to the knowledge that is needed for
interpreting the noun phrase]’.
In short, describing and indicating put very different cognitive demands on their addressees: describing
requires an intellectual operation from the addressee; he has to determine which object(s) fit a certain set
of properties, whereas indicating relies on the addressee being open to conspicuous or stylized actions (cf.
Clark, 1996:167) for directing their attention to a particular object.
3.2 Intensity of Indicating and Demonstratives
When people refer to objects, they often combine indicating and describing. For instance, the demonstrative
noun phrase “this block” combined with a pointing act relies both on description (the noun ‘block’ contributes
the descriptive content that the referent is of the type block) and indicating (the pointing act that draws
attention to the referent). We will call a referring act that, in addition to or instead of a description, includes
an act of indicating –such as a pointing– indexical. We use the term indexical demonstrative as shorthand
for a referring act combining an indicating act and a demonstrative noun phrase.
The relation between demonstratives and indicating has been discussed by various authors. In Kaplan’s
(1990:20) seminal work, demonstrative reference is even equated with indexical reference: “[demonstrative
reference is] use of a singular denoting phrase when the speaker intends that the object for which the phrase
stands be designated by an associated demonstration [e.g., a pointing act]”. Roberts (2002) points out that
according to diachronic evidence the current day demonstrative has very likely evolved from a (spatially)
indexical demonstrative. This suggests that indexical demonstratives represent the prototypical use of
demonstrative noun phrases. We share this assumption, and therefore focus our study, in the first instance,
on indexical demonstratives.
We already pointed out that indicating is fundamentally different from describing in that it involves the
directing of attention of the addressee to an object through direct physical means, rather than reliance on,
what Peirce calls, an intellectual operation by the addressee. This specific nature of indicating affords it
with a particular property: an act of indicating can be varied in intensity. Consider a situation in which
someone knocks on a door to make their presence known. Depending on the circumstances, this person
may apply more or less force when knocking on the door. If no one shows up to open the door within a
reasonable length of time, he or she is likely to intensify the force used to knock on the door, hoping that
the resulting sound is sufficiently loud to attract attention. More generally, in a situation in which indicating
is performed via the auditory channel, degrees of intensity can be realized by varying the volume of the
indicating act – though this is by no means the only way to intensify an auditory act of indicating, for
instance, pitch is another means for intensifying. In everyday life, we usually perceive at least two degrees
of intensity of indicating: typically there is a neutral way for performing a particular type of indicating act
(such as knocking on a door), and there are ways that are perceived as more intense or marked.
Our concept of intensity of indicating is closely related to the concept of deixis which is characterized
in the context of pronominal reference as “the force with which the hearer is instructed to seek the refer-
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ent of the pronoun” (Garcı´a, 1975:65). Garcı´a proposes that there are two degrees of deixis: high deixis
is an instruction to find the referent, whereas low deixis is a less emphatic and vaguer instruction for the
hearer to “look neither hard nor far” for the referent. According to Garcı´a, high deixis is appropriate
when it is difficult to find the reference, whereas low deixis is suitable for those situations where it not
difficult and less effort is needed to find the referent. The notion of deixis was used in Kirsner (1979)
to provide instructional meanings for the Dutch distal and proximal demonstratives. Kirsner’s pioneering
quantitative studies concerned demonstratives in text rather than conversation. Our main hypothesis for
demonstratives in conversation (see below) follows Kirsner’s proposal: proximals are associated with
intense indicating/high deixis and distals with neutral indicating/low deixis. If our hypothesis is confirmed,
this will provide evidence for a uniform analysis of Dutch demonstratives in both text and conversation.
We have recast the concept of deixis in terms of intensity of indicating in order make explicit how our work
fits in with recent studies into reference, in particular, the influential quantitative studies of multimodal
reference by Herbert Clark and collaborators; see, e.g., Clark and Bangerter (2004).
The main hypothesis of this paper is that indexical proximal demonstratives are used for intensive
indicating and indexical distals for neutral indicating. This hypothesis brings together the special relation
between demonstratives and indicating and the empirical finding that there is a systematic difference
in the intensity of the vowels in distals and proximals: Woodworth (1991:280) found that in a sample
representative of the set of language types across the world, the proximal form in a language tended to have
a vowel whose pitch is higher than that of the distal form in the same language (using binomial probability,
the null hypothesis of no difference between the two forms was rejected with p = 0.0037 by Woodworth,
1991:284).5
In order to test this hypothesis, we formulate two sub-hypotheses which relate intensity of indicating
to the circumstances of use. Just like the intensity with which we knock on a door depends on the
situation (whether there is a response, presence of background noise, etc.), the choice between (a) intense
indicating with a proximal versus (b) neutral indicating with a distal is assumed to be causally related to
the circumstances in which the utterance is produced.
Our sub-hypotheses are grounded in a long tradition of research into the role of information structure
in communication. For example, Halliday (1985:59) proposes a distinction between the given as ‘what is
presented as being already known to the listener’ and the new as ‘what the listener is being invited to attend
to as new, or unexpected, or important’. The new is marked in a sentence as bearing stress/pitch accent.
Here we concentrate on the interpretation of the new as (1) that what the addressee is being invited to attend
to as new (though we use the term low accessibility instead of newness. The former has a firmer foundation
in the psychological literature which we discuss below), and (2) that what the addressee is being invited to
attend to as important:
H-ACC: Indexical proximal demonstratives are preferred by speakers to refer to entities with
low accessibility, whereas indexical distal demonstratives are preferred to refer to entities with
high accessibility.
H-IMP: Indexical proximal demonstratives are preferred by speakers to refer to entities which
are important, whereas indexical distal demonstratives are preferred to refer to entities which
are less important.
These hypotheses rely on two cognitive notions, i.e., notions which are grounded in the information-processing
capacities of human language users: accessibility and importance. Further motivation for the two hypotheses
is provided in the next section. Let us now first elaborate on the notions of accessibility and importance
that we propose to put to work.
Accessibility and related notions such as cognitive status have been dealt with by a variety of authors.
Notably, Ariel (1990) and Gundel et al. (1993) applied it to study reference in texts. Here we use
the notion as characterized in Kahneman (2003), which extends the scope of the notion beyond textual
5Woodworth’s (1991) work confirmed preliminary results obtained in an earlier study by Ultan (1984). Woodworth’s work presents
a refinement of Ultan’s work by focusing on a single criterion for vowel quality (value of the second formant), rather than a variety of
articulatory measures (which cannot be compared along a single parameter).
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accessibility. This is crucial for our investigation which involves referring acts to objects in the speech
situation. According to Kahneman “[...] accessibility—the ease (of effort) with which particular mental
contents come to mind. The accessibility of a thought is determined jointly by the characteristics of the
cognitive mechanisms that produce it and by the characteristics of the stimuli and events that evoke it.
[...] the determinants of accessibility subsume the notions of stimulus salience, selective attention, specific
training, associative activation, and priming.” (Kahneman, 2003:699) and “As this discussion illustrates,
much is known about the determinants of accessibility, but there is no general theoretical account of
accessibility and no prospect of one emerging soon. [...] For these purposes, what matters is that empirical
generalizations about the determinants of differential accessibility are widely accepted and that there are
accepted procedures for testing the validity of particular hypotheses.” (Kahneman, 2003, 702) We follow
the approach outlined here. The determinant of accessibility that we will employ is the widely accepted
notion of a focus of attention (i.e., the focus of attention has high accessibility).
Much of what has been said about accessibility also applies to importance. Again, there is not yet a
general theory of this notion. Determinants can, however, be identified by starting from the insight that
importance is goal-dependent: A fact, object or event is important for an agent, if it is perceived to be
relevant by the agent for the attainment of her or his goals/desires. Although it might often be difficult to
obtain certainty about the goals and desires of an agent, this does not mean that the notion is completely
beyond empirical scrutiny. In clearly defined situations of human activity (such as the one described in the
next section; see also Clark 1996 who discusses the role of joint activities in communication), it is possible
to determine the goals of the interlocutors and consequently also the importance of objects (relative to these
goals).
3.3 Related Work on Dutch and English
The two hypotheses on the relation between indexical proximal and distal demonstratives on the one hand
and accessibility and importance on the other are partly motivated by existing qualitative and quantitative
findings on the use of distal and proximal demonstratives in both Dutch and English. In this section, we
review those findings and also some other findings which, at least at first sight, appear to contradict the
hypothesis on accessibility.
3.3.1 Accessibility
In written discourse, one of the determinants of accessibility of the referent of an antecedent is the distance
between the antecedent and the anaphoric expression (cf. Ariel, 1990): accessibility decreases as the
distance grows. For a corpus of Dutch texts, Kirsner (1979, p.365) found that the proximal demonstrative is
used to refer to objects over longer stretches of intervening text than the distal demonstrative. He compared
references within the same sentence with references one sentence back and references further back than
one sentence. This finding supports the hypothesis H-ACC which relates proximates to low accessibility.
The findings on English concerning low accessibility are, at least at first sight, not consistent with the
findings for Dutch. The most substantial quantitative study of distal versus proximal demonstratives (and
other referring expressions) and referent accessibility is Gundel et al. (1993). Drawing on, amongst others,
Chafe (1976), Gundel (1978), Prince (1981) and Grosz & Sidner (1986), Gundel et al. adopt a scale of
discrete cognitive statuses. The statuses are: focus, activated, familiar, uniquely identifiable, referential
and type identifiable. Referents become less easy to retrieve from memory as we descend the scale. In our
terms, accessibility decreases as we descend the scale.
Gundel et al. found that in an English corpus consisting of various naturally occurring data (including
transcripts from casual conversations and TV Talk shows, novels, etc.) both the distal and proximal
demonstratives were used only once to refer to an in focus referent. All the remaining (26) occurrences of
the proximal demonstratives consisted of references to activated referents. The remaining occurrences of
the distal demonstrative were distributed 27 : 7 over activated and familiar referents. Thus both proximal
and distal demonstratives tended to be used predominantly to refer to activated referents. However, distals
were also used to refer to referents with the lower cognitive status familiar. In the discussion section of this
paper we take a closer look at these findings which associate proximals with referents whose accessibility
is higher than that of the referents of distals and propose an interpretation in light of our findings for Dutch.
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Additionally, there are other data on English which point in different direction from those collected by
Gundel et al. Strauss (2002) examined a corpus of conversational American English. She observes that
“this” typically occurs with other phrases that are intended to attract the attention of the hearer (Strauss,
2002:148):
(5) Crandall: Don’t’cha see
All of this-
No no
Donthcu understand
. . .
Crandall: Now,
You see now
This is the kind of thing that bothers me
In other words, “this” co-occurs with other means for marking newness of information in Halliday’s
(1985) sense. “that” on the other seems to co-occur more often with ways of marking given/familiar
information (Strauss, 2002:149):
(6) Curt: Hey, Where can I get a:::uh, ’member the old
twenty-three Model T spring,
(0.5)
Backspring came up like that [Does gesture showing shape of part]
. . .
Here ’member (for “remember”) marks shared information and precedes the distal demonstrative “that”.
Unfortunately, the differences between “this” and “that” illustrated in 5 and 6 are not supported by Strauss
with further quantitative data.
3.3.2 Importance
Kirsner (1979) reports a number of quantitative results from a corpus study that suggest that Dutch proximal
demonstratives associate more frequently than the distal demonstratives with referents that are perceived
to be important by the speaker. In particular, Kirsner (1979:361-364) found that (a) proximals are used
significantly more to refer to human referents than distals; (b) proximals are used significantly more to
refer to individual (as opposed to plural) referents than distals; (c) proximals are used significantly more
to refer to named individuals than distals and (d) proximals are used significantly more in subject position
than distals.
Kirsner & Van Heuven (1988:225) report, again on the basis of a statistical analysis of a Dutch corpus,
that proximal demonstratives are associated to a larger extent with reinterpreting noun phrases than distal
demonstratives. A reinterpreting noun phrase refers to a linguistic antecedent by using a new description
rather than by repetition of (part of) the antecedent. In the following extract from Hume (1739/1984:289),
the noun phrase “this brief exposition of the principles of that famous atheist” (re)interprets the preceding
paragraphs, using expressions such as ‘brief’ and ‘exposition’ and ‘famous’, imposing an interpretation on
these paragraphs.
(7) The fundamental principle of atheism of Spinoza is the doctrine of the simplicity of the universe, and
the unity of that substance, in which he supposes both thought and matter to inhere [...]
I believe this brief exposition of the principles of that famous atheist will be sufficient for the present
purpose, [...]
Kirsner & Van Heuven (1988) argue that the use of reinterpreting noun phrases signals that the referent
in question is considered important by the speaker: “In contrast to simple repetition of referents, summarizing
or reinterpreting suggests an integration or adaptation of material into larger discourse topics, so that
the speaker can communicate a message which goes beyond a mere listing of entities. Summarizing
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or interpreting seem more involved than repetition with the central rather than peripheral aspects of a
text.”(Kirsner & Van Heuven, 1988, p.229).
For English there are also some intuitive judgments which suggest that proximals are used to refer
to more important referents than distals. Lakoff (1974:350) remarks about example 8 that “There seems,
however, to be a subtle feeling in [8.a] that the speaker remains involved in the subject, and may well go
on to say more about it. That [in 8.b] distances the speaker from the report, making it less likely that he
will expatiate on it”.
(8) a. The prime minister made his long-awaited announcement yesterday. This statement confirmed
the speculations of many observers.
b. The prime minister made his long-awaited announcement yesterday. That statement confirmed
the speculations of many observers.
If we follow Lakoff’s analysis (see also Wright & Givon, 1987), 8 is a further example where the choice
between “this” and “that” is influenced by the importance of the referent; assuming that speakers are more
likely to continue speaking about referents which they currently deem important. Glover (2000) argues a
related point on the basis of a qualitative analysis of the transcripts of a urban planning department meeting.
According to her, the choice between proximal and distal demonstratives is associated with problematic or
unresolved and typically new issues (which require further discussion) versus referents with an established
context, respectively.
Finally, the data reported in Botley & McEnery (2001) suggest that also in English proximal demonstratives
are more often used for reinterpretation than distals. Botley & McEnery carried out frequency counts on the
demonstratives in a collection of three corpora. We analyzed the counts presented in table 3, p.15. of Botley
& McEnery. We looked at the distribution of proximal and distal demonstratives over recoverable and not
directly recoverable antecedents (this distinction corresponds to the non-reinterpreting–reinterpreting noun
phrases distinction we discussed above). For proximal demonstratives we have the distribution 900 : 677
(57% : 43%) for directly recoverable versus not directly recoverable antecedents. For distal demonstratives
the distribution is 641 : 333 (66% : 34%). These figures show a slight skewing for proximals, when
compared to distals, to refer to referents that are not directly recoverable. The result is statistically highly
significant (χ2df=1 = 19.23, P < 0.001), although the effect size is small (r = 0.09). The aforementioned
findings together provide some initial support for our hypothesis H-IMP. In the next section, we subject
this hypothesis to a new empirical test.
4 A Dialogue Game: Corpus Collection and Results
In order to study the deictic use of demonstratives we need instances of demonstratives which are used to
directly refer to objects in the environment of the interlocutors. There are a number of alternative ways to
gather such data. Empirical approaches can be thought of as occupying a scale from situations where the
experimenter has no control over the situation which s/he observes to situations where as many features of
the situation as possible are under his or her control. The former situation is typical for the kind of studies
which are carried out by conversation analysts whereas the latter are encountered in experimental studies.
Both extremes have their advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, conversation analytical studies
involve real-world natural conversations but are often difficult to study due to parameters which are hidden
from the experimenter. On the other hand, experimental studies provide the experimenter with an extensive
insight into the parameters of the situation but can also lead to the study of artificial situations or situations
which hardly ever occur in the real world.
In this paper, we describe an approach that occupies the middle ground. Our aim is to study fairly
controlled situations which allow the subjects enough room to exhibit natural communicative behavior. We
build on the insight that language use has to be understood with reference to the activity in which it takes
place (e.g., Levinson, 1992; Clark, 1996; Beun & Cremers, 1998; Ku¨hnlein et al, to appear). Our aim is to
make sure that the parameters of this activity are known to the experimenter. This means that s/he designs
such an activity, henceforth a dialogue game, and gets his or her subjects to communicate within the bounds
of this game. We propose to define such a dialogue game in terms of four components/parameters.
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A DIALOGUE GAME consists of:
1. A set of PARTICIPANTS;
2. An INITIAL STATE OF PLAY;
3. A JOINT PUBLIC GOAL STATE which the participants are supposed to achieve;
4. A ROLE FUNCTION which assigns to each of the participants its entitlements, prohibitions
and abilities to access various types of information and perform various types of action
during the game.
4.1 Set-up for corpus collection
The corpus of dialogues which we used for this study was collected by having subjects play the following
dialogue game.
1. PARTICIPANTS: The set of participants consists of two subjects.
2. INITIAL STATE: In the initial state the participants are separated by an opaque screen and facing a
foundation plate (38x38cm) which is occupied by a building made of LEGO blocks of the DUPLO
series (see figures 1 and 2). One of the participants is located next to another foundation plate with
an example building on it and the other is located next to a box containing more blocks.
3. JOINT PUBLIC GOAL STATE: The goal state is achieved when the building on the shared foundation
plate is identical to the example building.
4. ROLE FUNCTION One of the participants is assigned the role of builder (B) and the other the role of
instructor (I). Both B and I can point at and observe all objects present on the foundation plate and
they are allowed to talk with each other. Whereas only B is allowed to move the objects with his or
her hands, only I has visual access to the example building.
FIGURE HERE
Figure 1: Schematic overview and photo of the experimental set-up, with B for builder and I for instructor
FIGURE HERE
Figure 2: Side view of types of blocks from the LEGO DUPLO series used in the experiment
Ten pairs of Dutch subjects engaged in a dialogue game of the described type. Before the game, they were
given a written explanation of the game. Half of the subjects were male, the other half female, and their
age varied from 20 to 60 years. They were all native speakers of the Dutch language. Their interactions
were recorded on video tape and subsequently transcribed.6
4.2 Definitions
In order to test our hypotheses with respect to the data collected in the aforementioned dialogue game, we
need to make the notions of accessibility and importance operational in the context of this dialogue game.
6The transcriptions can be found in Cremers (1993).
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Accessibility For the purpose of our empirical study, we consider a well-established determinant of the
accessibility of a referent: focus of attention.7 There are two types of focus of attention: discourse focus
(Grosz, 1977) and domain focus. We concentrate on domain focus, since we are interested in deictic
reference: in our corpus, we only looked for those referring acts that were used for initial identification of
objects in the domain of discourse. These were all deictic acts of reference, because the speakers referred
directly to a physical object in the shared domain of conversation without mediation of the preceding
linguistic context. An object is part of the domain focus if it satisfies one of the following two criteria (cf.
Cremers, 1994):
1. The object was referred to in the preceding utterance or is adjacent to an object that was referred to
in the preceding utterance;
2. The object lies in an area to which the speaker explicitly directed the attention of the addressee. This
is marked by what we will call focussing expressions as in ‘Wat nou helemaal naar voren zit, daar zit
die rode dwars’ (literally: What now entirely to the front is, there is that red one diagonally. Loose
translation: If you look at the bit in the front, you will find a red diagonally placed block).
Within the scope of our study, we will use the term High Domain Accessibility (HDA). An object has High
Domain Accessibility (+HDA) if and only if it is part of the domain focus. Otherwise, it is labelled –HDA.
Importance We start from the assumption that the task at hand determines which objects are more
important than other objects. In this particular dialogue game, objects which are talked about or manipulated
as part of the execution of the task are more important than other objects which do not play such a role.
Within the aforementioned class of more important objects we can make a further distinction. In the
task that we have described, the central activity is the manipulation of blocks. The instructor communicates
to the builder which blocks have to be manipulated (e.g., Remove the green cube). On the basis of this
distinction we characterize blocks as either + or – important: A block is classified as +important at time t
if the instructor tells the builder to manipulate this particular block at t. All other blocks, at the same point
in time t, are labelled –important.8
We can determine whether a block is +important or –important by examining whether the utterance in
which the referring act to the block occurs is an instruction to manipulate it. Note that objects are not only
referred to because they have to be manipulated. Blocks can also be referred to in order to specify other
parameters of manipulations. Consider the following fragment from Cremers (1993:47):
(9) I: ...
Alles wat hier achter die gele steen staat mag weg.
All what here behind that yellow stone stands can go.
Everything behind that yellow stone can go.
...
Here the yellow stone is used to identify a group of blocks which need to be removed: ‘that yellow stone’
serves to help with identifying the referents of the phrase ‘Everything behind that yellow stone’. In the
7Focus of attention is an important determinant of accessibility among several other determinants (see section 3.2). Other deter-
minants include: training, priming, salience and association. Arguably, the notion of domain focus that is used in this study can be
viewed as a combination of attention and association (as a result proximity in physical space). Neither priming nor training were
taken into account, given that we dealt exclusively with initial referring acts. Salience was also not taken into account, because no
clear operational definition of salience was available for the current set-up. By salience we mean: (1) inherent properties of objects
that attract attention and (2) relative frequency of a particular property in comparison with other properties (e.g., a single blue block
among one hundred red blocks will attract attention not because of the inherent salience of the blue block, but the relative frequency
of its colour). Neither colour, shape nor size of the objects were particularly salient. Objects were coloured red, green, yellow and
blue (each being either a primary colour of pigment or light) and were present in roughly equal numbers. Most objects had the shape
of a beam, whereas some were convex or concave. Again, this did not appear to make them visually more salient. Neither were there
dramatic differences in size between objects.”
8Note that there are parallels and differences between this notion of importance and the concept of high topicality or discourse
prominence that is common in linguistics: an object that is being introduced is called discourse prominent if it is going to be the
primary topic of the immediately following discourse. For our notion of importance, it is not such much the immediate discourse that
is relevant, but rather the immediately following task-oriented actions: in these actions the +important object plays a central role.
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following fragment (Cremers, 1993:43) the red block is used to indicate where and how the blue block has
to be put.
(10) I: ...
[En] die blauwe die moet aan de rechs(t)e kant gelijk komen
[And] that blue that must on the righthand side come aligned
And that blue one has be aligned on its righthand side
met de zijkant van de rode.
with the side of the red.
with the side of the red one.
...
4.3 Results
The ten dialogues that were obtained from the dialogue game contained 108 instances of initial demonstrative
referring acts to blocks. This included 14 referring acts which consisted of plural noun phrases and 1
instance where the speaker self-corrected (“die dit rode blokje”, literally: that this red block [diminutive
form]). We excluded the plural references and the self-correction from our investigation. Of the remaining
93 demonstratives, 50 were indexical and 43 were non-indexical. Their distribution over proximals and
distals is presented in Fig. 3. These demonstratives included both demonstrative pronouns and demonstratives
with a demonstrative determiner.
FIGURE HERE
Figure 3: Results on distribution of Dutch variants of the proximal this (...) (dit/deze (...)) and distal that
(...) (die/dat (...)) over indexical and non-indexical referring acts
FIGURE HERE
Figure 4: Results on domain accessibility and importance for the Dutch variants of indexical this (...)
(dit/deze (...)) and that (...) (die/dat (...))
We now discuss the results obtained from the data for our two hypotheses. A graphical representation
of the results pertinent to H-ACC and H-IMP can be found in Fig. 4.
H-ACC: Indexical proximal demonstratives are preferred by speakers to refer to entities with
low accessibility, whereas indexical distal demonstratives are preferred to refer to entities with
high accessibility.
The distribution of indexical proximals over +HDA (High Domain Accessibility) and –HDA objects was
10:16, whereas the distribution of indexical distals over +HDA and –HDA objects was 18:6. These data
support the hypothesis. There is a statistically significant relationship (χ2df=1 = 6.76, r = 0.37, P < 0.01)
between whether the intended referent is +HDA or –HDA and the type of demonstrative (i.e., proximal
versus distal): of all indexical demonstrative references to +HDA objects, 64.3% are distals, whereas of
those to –HDA objects, 72.7% are proximals.
This result on indexical demonstratives comprises the behavior of our sample of 20 participants. Out
of these 20, 11 individuals never used indexical demonstratives. The remaining group of 9 included 6
instructors who used indexical demonstratives and 3 builders who did as well. We checked the compatibility
of the behavior of these 9 individual speakers with H-Acc.
6 participants used proximals more frequently than distals for –HDA objects, and only 3 participants
did the reverse. For +HDA objects, 6 participants used distals more frequently than proximals, whereas 3
did the reverse. In both cases, the majority of subjects acted in line with H-Acc. Note that this view of the
results is from the speaker’s perspective. The speaker needs to decide whether to use a proximal or a distal
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given the HDA status of a referent. It does not tell us how helpful the distal/proximal distinction is from
the point of view of an addressee.
An addressee might want to determine whether the referent of a given demonstrative is +HDA or –HDA.
For instance, suppose that the addressee knows that a speaker has so far used 50 distals for +HDA and 10
proximals for +HDA and that she also uses 2 distals –HDA and 7 proximals for –HDA. On the basis of this
information and the fact that the current referring act by this speaker consist of a proximal, the addressee’s
best bet is that the referent is +HDA, because +HDA referents outnumber –HDA referents. In this example,
even though the speaker acts in line with H-Acc (she prefers proximals over distals for –HDA objects) the
addressee has to conclude that the speaker is most likely to refer to a +HDA object when the speaker uses
a proximal.
In our data, the relation between proximals and –HDA and distals and +HDA also existed when the
data were analyzed from the addressee’s point of view: we found that all individuals, except for one, used
proximals more frequently to refer to –HDA than to +HDA objects. There was only one individual whose
behavior deviated from this: this was a builder who only once used an indexical demonstrative, and in that
single instance used a proximal to refer to a +HDA object. Also, all individuals, except for one, used distals
more frequently to refer to +HDA objects than to -HDA objects. The single outlier used 4 distals to refer
to –HDA objects and 3 distals for +HDA objects.
H-IMP: Indexical proximal demonstratives are preferred by speakers to refer to entities which
are important, whereas indexical distal demonstratives are preferred to refer to entities which
are less important.
The distribution of indexical proximals over +important and –important objects is 22:4, whereas the distribution
of indexical distals over +important and –important objects is 19:5. These data are not statistically significant:
there is no statistically significant relationship between whether the intended referent is +important or
–important and the type of indexical demonstrative (i.e., proximal versus distal).
5 Discussion
Contrary to some previous work on demonstratives, our study did not support our second hypothesis that
(indexical) proximals, as opposed to (indexical) distals, are preferred for reference to important objects.
This result might, however, be caused by the specific interpretation of the notion of importance that we
used in this study. We differentiated between objects that need to be manipulated and those that do not, and
argued that the former are more important than the latter in the dialogue game that we set up. One could
argue that this distinction is too fine-grained: objects that are identified in order to specify the location
of another object or its orientation are important, since identification of such objects is also crucial to
successful completion of the task at hand.
A second way to explain the failure of this hypothesis is to assume that importance primarily influences
whether the speaker indicates (i.e., points), rather than the intensity of the indicating act. More generally
speaking, the idea would be that importance influences the engagement or involvement of the speaker
with the referent,9 and one specific form of physical involvement would be pointing. Let us assume
for a moment that this is correct. Then we expect reference to +important objects to involve indexical
demonstratives more often than reference to –important objects. Additionally, note that we actually found
in our observational study that indexical demonstratives as opposed to non-indexical demonstratives are
more likely to involve a proximal demonstrative (see Figure 3). Thus a link, though it is indirect, can be
established between importance and type of demonstrative (proximal versus distal). This was, however,
obscured in our study (especially, Figure 4) by our focus on indexical demonstratives only. Example 4 is
suggestive of the relation between speaker involvement and type of demonstrative: there the doctor, who is
palpating the patient, uses a proximal demonstrative.
The argument we just put forward rests on the assumption that importance and speaker involvement
(e.g., pointing) are positively correlated. As a preliminary investigation into this assumption, we conducted
a post-hoc analysis of our data consisting of 93 demonstrative referring acts. These included 50 indexical
9We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing our attention to this dimension.
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referring acts and 43 non-indexical referring acts. The distribution of indexical referring acts over +important
and –important objects was 41:9, whereas the distribution of non-indexical referring acts (i.e., referring act
that are not accompanied by pointing) over +important and –important objects was 24:19. In other words,
82% of the indexical referring acts concerned a +important referent, whereas only 56% of the non-indexical
referring acts concerned a +important referent. This finding is statistically significant (χ2df=1 = 7.53, r =
0.28, P < 0.01). In conclusion, these post-hoc findings do suggest that the relation between importance
and type of demonstrative might be mediated via the dimension of speaker engagement/involvement (in
particular, in terms of pointing).
Our results do support our first hypothesis, i.e., the hypothesized correlation between indexical proximals
and –HDA (High Domain Accessibility) objects and indexical distals and +HDA objects. This holds both
for the participants as a group and for a majority of the participants individually. We examined not just
the behavior of the participants as a group, but also the behavior of each individual participant, to make
sure that the statistics derived from the data corresponded with behavior that was exhibited by individual
participants. We are aware of the dangers of building models of language production solely on the basis
of averaging behaviors of individuals: we always need to verify that such averages correspond with the
behavior of individual language producers, since that is not necessarily the case (just like the average
family with 2.5 children does not exist).
Studies into the difference between proximal and distal demonstratives often invoke the notion of
contrastiveness (e.g., Maes and Noordman, 1995). In the current study, we did come across some contrastive
pairs (of the form this . . . that . . .). These were, however, too limited in number (4 pairs on a total of 93
demonstrative referring acts) for any quantitative results. Interestingly, we also found that at least in Dutch
co-occurring demonstrative and locative expressions need not always converge (we found instances of die
groene hier, which is literally: that green here; loose translation: that green one here).
In the remainder of this section, we return to the findings on demonstratives for English that were
reported in Gundel et al. (1993). These seem, at first sight, to contradict our findings. Closer inspection
does, however, allow resolution of the apparent differences and leads to some suggestions for expanding
the scope of our model of the difference between distal and proximal demonstratives. For this purpose,
we will also discuss further statistics on the use of demonstratives and other referring expressions that
were obtained from our observational study. We report these statistics at this point, rather than in the
results section of this paper, because we want to keep a clear distinction between the statistics in the results
section which were arrived at on the basis of prior hypotheses and the statistics in this section which we
arrived at through post-hoc analysis of the data.
5.1 English versus Dutch Demonstratives?
In their English corpus, Gundel et al. (1993) found that both the distal and proximal demonstratives were
used only once to refer to an “in focus” referent. All the remaining (26) occurrences of the proximal
demonstratives consisted of references to activated referents. The remaining occurrences of the distal
demonstrative were distributed 27 : 7 over activated and familiar referents. Thus both proximal and distal
demonstratives tended to be used predominantly to refer to activated referents. However, distals were also
used to refer to referents with the lower cognitive status familiar.
How do we relate these findings to the results reported in this paper? At first sight, it seems straightforward:
we associate statuses that are high on the givenness scale with high accessibility and those lower on the
scale with low accessibility. Under this interpretation our results for Dutch are in direct contradiction
with the ones for English reported by Gundel et al. There is, however, an alternative interpretation that
reconciles these at first sight incompatible data. For this interpretation, we need to take into account the
fact that for the purposes of Gundel et al. the act of pointing functioned as a criterion for labelling an
object as having a high cognitive status/being highly accessible (Gundel, personal communication). Thus
the findings of Gundel et al. could reflect the fact that proximals are always indexical, whereas distals can
also be non-indexical (i.e., occur without a pointing act). Post-hoc analysis of our data reveals precisely
that pattern (see also Fig. 3): whereas 26 out of 27 proximals in our corpus are indexical only 24 out of 66
distals are indexical (a statistically highly significant distribution: χ2df=1 = 27.69, r = 0.55, P < 0.001.
There is further converging evidence from a variety of sources which suggests that the link between distals
and indicating is less strong than that between proximals and indicating.
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Diachronic studies into the distal and proximal demonstrative terms have linked distals to the definite
article. In particular, for Indo-European languages the definite article has been traced back to the distal
demonstrative pronoun (Christophersen, 1939; Ayto, 1990). The fact that it was the distal that developed
into the prototypical means for reference through describing, i.e., the definite description, suggests that
there has been a stage at which the distal developed away from its prototypical use as device for indicating
into a device for describing, thus no longer requiring the co-occurrence of other acts of indicating such as
pointing.
5.2 Back to nearby and faraway
The folk-view of demonstratives is that distals refer to objects faraway from the speaker and proximals
to close-by objects. Bu¨hler (1934) worked out this idea in more detail, introducing the notion of distance
to a deictic center/origo. More recent textbooks on language use, such as Clark (1996:168) also discuss
the proximal/distal opposition using the labels nearby and faraway. In this section, we wish to investigate
whether the persistence of this view makes sense in the light of recent empirical findings on referring acts
including our own.
The data collected in our corpus appear to contradict the nearby/faraway analysis: we found that
proximals are used more frequently to refer to entities with low accessibility than distals. Low accessibility
has by some been equated with faraway and high accessibility with nearby; e.g., see Ariel’s 1990 account
of distal and proximal demonstratives. Under this interpretation, our results are not compatible with the
traditional nearby/faraway analysis.
There is, however, an alternative way of looking at our results. For this we need to make an excursion
into the use of pointing. Clark & Bangerter (2004) dub pointing acts to objects that are within reach of
the speaker’s arm close pointing and suggest that this type pointing allows for precise identification of
the intended referent. They contrast it with distant pointing, where the things pointed at are out of arms’
reach and pointing is less precise. In an experiment by Bangerter (2004), speakers tended to point less the
more distant the referent was, presumably because speakers prefer precise close pointing and when this is
not available seek alternative ways for identifying an object, in particular, description. Our data show that
proximals always require a pointing act. Thus, if it is true that when speakers refer to more distant objects,
they also use less pointing, then when speakers refer to more distant objects, we would expect them to also
use fewer proximals. Thus, the association of proximals with nearby referents and distals with ones that
are faraway is not only compatible with our analysis, but is even predicted by it.
6 Summary and Conclusions
The first half of this paper reports on a quantitative that explores the use of indexical distal and proximal
demonstratives. That is, we focused on both proximal and distal demonstratives that are accompanied
by a pointing act. We proposed a cognitive model of the use of these demonstratives which relates the
choice between the distal and proximal form to the accessibility and importance of the intended referent.
This relation was established via the notions of intense and neutral indicating: we argued that proximals
are intense indicators and therefore are used to refer to objects that have a low accessibility and/or are
important. In contrast, distals are considered to be neutral indicators and predicted to be used more
frequently to refer to objects that have a high accessibility and/or are less important. To investigate the
validity of this model we collected a corpus of task-oriented dialogues between pairs of Dutch participants.
The hypotheses on the relation between proximals/distals and accessibility was borne out by the data. The
relation between proximals/distals and importance was, however, refuted. A post-hoc analysis showed that
importance might be linked with the use of a pointing act rather than the choice of demonstrative: important
objects were pointed at significantly more often than less important objects.
In the second half of this paper, we extended the scope of our analysis beyond indexical demonstratives.
We presented evidence from a number of sources (corpus-based, diachronic, experimental and introspective)
showing that it is the distal demonstrative that is used for non-indexical reference, i.e., reference without a
pointing act. This allowed us to reconcile results on use of demonstratives in Dutch and English and, last
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but not least, to show how our model is compatible with, and even predicts the folk-view analysis of the
distal/proximal distinction in terms of faraway and nearby.
Proximal and distal demonstratives can, as we pointed out at the beginning of this paper, be found in all
languages. This led us to suspect that despite differences in use among individual languages, there might be
a universal cognitive principle underlying the use of demonstratives across languages. We proposed that a
principle based on the notion of intensity of indicating can play this role. Our starting point was the insight
that indicating –the directing of attention– is an action which can be carried out with more or less intensity,
and in this respect differs from symbolic and iconic signaling. We fleshed out this idea by investigating
intensity of indicating in relation to the cognitive notions of accessibility and importance. We succeeded in
linking accessibility via intensity of indicating to the proximal/distal distinction.
Note that our approach leaves room for differences in the use of distals and proximals among individual
languages. For instance, though accessibility and importance are cognitive notions, they are relative to
the ways that interlocutors perceive the world around them and their goals. Consequently, for different
communities of language users and in different contexts, the use of proximal versus distal demonstratives
can vary. We have emphasized that all languages have a pair of deictically contrastive demonstrative terms
(proximal versus distal). Most European languages are restricted to this two-way distinction, however,
some languages have additional terms either indicating a position between proximal and distal, or introducing
the location of the hearer as a further reference point for accessibility and importance (see Diessel, 1999:50).
It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine such further demonstrative terms in detail. The current
proposal can, however, accommodate further demonstrative terms, since the notion of intensity of indicating
allows for more than the current two levels of intensity (i.e., intense and neutral).
Through the notion of intensity of indicating, we have provided a viable alternative to the common
equivocation in linguistics of high accessibility with proximity and low accessibility with distance. This
alternative was made possible by the insight that the use of proximals versus distals needs explanation in
terms of what speakers do when they use a proximal or a distal. The traditional approach assumes that
the distal or proximal demonstrative merely reflects some feature of reality, i.e., distance of the object to
the speaker, whereas in our, essentially dynamic and action-oriented, approach the difference between the
two lies in what the speaker is doing, i.e., the force/intensity with which s/he directs the attention of the
addressee. This gives rise to an alternative view on the possible meanings/uses of linguistic expressions
which moves away from the idea of language as simply a tool for reflecting reality.
Finally, a note of caution is needed. The accessibility of the referent accounts only for part of the
variation in use. Further studies need to be carried out to identify other factors which influence the choice
between intense and neutral indicating.
Acknowledgments
For useful comments and suggestions on the current study, we would like to thank the audiences at the
Leverhulme Dialogue Workshop at Royal Holloway College, the Computing Department’s Seminar at the
University of Aberdeen, and the Seminar of the Collaborative Research Centre SFB 360 at the University
of Bielefeld. We are particularly grateful for the extremely helpful comments and suggestions that we
received from the anonymous reviewers of the Journal of Pragmatics. Finally, we would also like to thank
Francis Chantree, Chris Douce and Hermi Tabachnek-Schijf for helping us improve the English. Of course,
any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.
References
Ariel, Mira, 1988. Referring and accessibility. Journal of Linguistics 24, 65–87.
Ariel, Mira, 1990. Accessing Noun-Phrase Antecedents. Routledge, London and New York.
18
Final draft of: Piwek et al. (2007). In: Journal of Pragmatics. Electronically published June 27 2007. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2007.05.001  
Ayto, John, 1990. The Bloomsbury Dictionary of Word Origins. Bloomsbury, London.
Bangerter, Adrian, 2004. Using pointing and describing to achieve joint focus of attention in dialogue.
Psychological Science 15(6), 415–419.
Beun, Robbert-Jan, Cremers, Anita, 1998. Object reference in a shared domain of conversation. Pragmatics
and Cognition 6(1/2), 121–152.
Botley, Simon, McEnery, Tony, 2001. Demonstratives in English: A Corpus-Based Study. Journal of
English Linguistics 29(1), 7–33.
Bu¨hler, Karl, 1934. Sprachtheorie: die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache. Fischer, Jena.
Biber, Douglas, Johansson, Stig, Leech, Geoffrey, Conrad, Susan, Finegan, Edward, 1999. Longman
Grammar of Spoken and Written English. Longman, Harlow.
Buchler, Justus, 1940. The Philosophy of Peirce: Selected Writings. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Butterworth, George, 2003. Pointing is the Royal Road to Language for Babies. In: Kita, S. (Ed.),
Pointing: Where Language, Culture and Cognition Meet, Lawrence Erlbaum, New Jersey, pp.9–34.
Associates.
Carter, David, 1987. Interpreting Anaphors in Natural Language Text. Ellis Horword, Wiley & Sons,
New York.
Chafe, Wallace, 1976. Givenness, contrastiveness, definiteness, subjects, topics and point of view. In: Li,
C.N. (Ed.), Subject and topic, Academic Press, New York, pp.25–55.
Christophersen, Paul, 1939. The Articles: A Study of their Theory and Use in English. Einar Munksgaard,
Copenhagen.
Clark, Herbert H., 1996. Using language. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Clark, Herbert H., Bangerter, Adrian, 2004. Changing Ideas about Reference. In: Noveck, I., Sperber, D.
19
Final draft of: Piwek et al. (2007). In: Journal of Pragmatics. Electronically published June 27 2007. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2007.05.001  
(Eds.), Experimental Pragmatics, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp.25–49.
Clark, Herbert H. & Marshall, Catherine R., 1981. Definite reference and mutual knowledge. In: Joshi,
A., Webber, B. Sag, I. (Eds.), Elements of discourse understanding, Cambridge University Press,
Cambrige, pp.10–63.
Cremers, Anita, 1993. Transcripties dialogen blokken-experiment. IPO report no. 889, Eindhoven.
Cremers, Anita, 1994. Referring in a shared workspace. In: Brouwer-Janse, M.D., Harrington, T.L.,
(Eds.), Human-machine communication for educational systems design, Springer Verlag, Heidelberg,
pp.71–78.
Diessel, Holger, 1999. Demonstratives: Form, Function and Grammaticalization. John Benjamins Publishing
Company, Amsterdam/Philadelphia.
Enfield, Nick, 2003. Demonstratives in space and interaction: Data from Lao speakers and implications
for semantic analysis. Language 79(1), 82–117.
Epstein, Richard, 2002. The definite article, accessibility, and the construction of discourse referents.
Cognitive Linguistics 12(4), 333–378.
Garcı´a, Erica C., 1975. The Role of Theory in Linguistic Analysis: The Spanish Pronoun System. North
Holland, Amsterdam.
Glover, Kelly D. (2000). Proximal and distal deixis in negotiation talk. Journal of Pragmatics 32,
915–926.
Grosz, Barbara, 1977. The representation and use of focus in dialogue understanding. Technical note
151, SRI International, Menlo Park.
Grosz, Barbara, Sidner, Candace, 1986. Attention, intentions, and the structure of discourse. Computational
Linguistics, 12, 175–204.
Gundel, Jeanette K., 1978. Stress, pronominalization and given-new distinction. University of Hawai
20
Final draft of: Piwek et al. (2007). In: Journal of Pragmatics. Electronically published June 27 2007. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2007.05.001  
Working Papers in Linguistics 10/2, 1–13.
Gundel, Jeanette K., Hedberg, Nancy, Zacharski, Ron, 1993. Cognitive Status and The Form of Referring
Expressions in Discourse, Language 69(2), 274–307.
Halliday, M.A.K., 1985. Introduction to Functional Grammar. Edward Arnold, London.
Hollingdale, Stuart, 1989. Makers of mathematics. Penguin Books, London.
Hume, David, 1984. A Treatise of Human Nature. Penguin Books, London. (Orginal work published in
1739 and 1740)
Jackendoff, Ray, 1983. Semantics and Cognition. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Janssen, Theo A.J.M., 1995. Deixis from a cognitive point of view. In: Contini-Morava, E., Sussman
Goldberg, B. (Eds.), Meaning as Explanation: Advances in Linguistic Sign Theory, Mouton de
Gruyter, Berlin, pp.245–270.
Jordan, Pamela W., 2000. Intentional Influences on Object Redescriptions in Dialogue: Evidence from an
Empirical Study. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Kahneman, Daniel, 2003. A Perspective on Judgement and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality.
American Psychologist 58(9), 697–720.
Kaplan, David, 1990. DTHAT. In: Yourgrau, P. (Ed.), Demonstratives, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
pp.11–33. (Reprinted from Syntax and Semantics, pp. 221–243, by P. Cole, Ed., 1978, New York:
Academic Press)
Katzner, Kenneth, 2002. The languages of the world. Routledge, London and New York.
Kemmerer, David, 1999. “Near” and “far” in language and perception. Cognition 73, 35–63.
Kirsner, Robert S., 1979. Deixis in Discourse: An Exploratory Quantitative Study of the Modern Dutch
Demonstrative Adjectives. In: Givo´n, T. (Ed.), Syntax and Semantics: Discourse and Syntax, Vol.
21
Final draft of: Piwek et al. (2007). In: Journal of Pragmatics. Electronically published June 27 2007. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2007.05.001  
12, Academic Press, New York, pp.355-375.
Kirsner, Robert S., 1985. What it Takes to Show Whether an Analysis ‘Fits’. In: Bluhme, H., Hammarstro¨m,
G. (Eds.), Descriptio Linguistica: Proceedings of the First Conference on Descriptive and Structural
Linguistics, Gunter Narr Verlag, Tu¨bingen, pp.76–112.
Kirsner, Robert S., 1993. From meaning to message in two theories: Cognitive and Saussurean views of
the Modern Dutch demonstratives. In: Geiger, R.A., Rudzka-Ostyn, B. (Eds.), Conceptualizations
and Mental Processing in Language, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, pp.81–114.
Kirsner, Robert S., Van Heuven, Vincent J., 1988. The significance of demonstrative position in modern
Dutch. Lingua 76, 209–248.
Krahmer, Emiel, 1998. Presupposition and Anaphora. CSLI Publications/Cambridge University Press,
Stanford/Cambridge.
Ku¨hnlein, Peter, Nimke, Manja, Stegmann, Jens, Forthcoming. Empirical issues in deictic gestures.
Report Situerte Ku¨nstliche Kommunikatoren (SFB 360), University of Bielefeld.
Lakoff, Robin, 1974. Remarks on this and that. In: Papers from the Tenth Regional Meeting of the
Chicago Linguistics Society, pp. 345–356.
Levinson, Stephen C., 1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Levinson, Stephen C., 1992. Activity types and language. In: Drew, P., Heritage, J. (Eds.), Talk at work:
Interaction in institutional settings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.66–100.
Levinson, Stephen C., 2004. Deixis and pragmatics. In: Horn, L. & Ward, G. (Eds.), The Handbook of
pragmatics, Blackwell, Oxford, pp.97–121.
Lewis, David, 1979. Scorekeeping in a language game. Journal of Philosophical Language 8, 339–359.
Longman Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed., 1991. Longman, Harlow.
22
Final draft of: Piwek et al. (2007). In: Journal of Pragmatics. Electronically published June 27 2007. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2007.05.001  
Maes, Fons and Noordman, Leo, 1995. Demonstrative nominal anaphors: a case of nonidentificational
markedness. Linguistics 33, 255–282.
Prince, Ellen, 1981. On the reference of indefinite-this NPs. In: Joshi, A., Webber, B., Sag, I. (Eds.),
Elements of discourse understanding, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.231–250.
Roberts, Craige, 2002. Demonstratives as Definites. In: van Deemter, K., Kibble, R. (Eds.), Information
Sharing, CSLI, Stanford, CA, pp.89–196.
Strauss, Susan, 2002. This, that and it in spoken American English: a demonstrative system of gradient
focus. Language Sciences 24, 121–152.
Ultan, Russell, 1984. Size-sound symbolism. In: Greenberg, J. (Ed.), Universals of Human Language,
vol. 4, Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp.525–568.
Van Dale: Groot Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal, 11nd ed., 1984. Van Dale Lexicografie, Utrecht/Antwerpen.
Weissenborn, Ju¨rgen, Klein, Wolfgang, 1982. Introduction. In: Weissenborn, J. and Klein, W. (Eds.),
Here and There, Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp.1–12.
Woodworth, N.L., 1991. Sound Symbolism in Proximal and Distal Forms. Linguistics 29, 273–299.
Wright, S., Givo´n, Talmy, 1987. The pragmatics of indefinite reference: quantified text-based studies.
Studies in Language 11(1), 1–33.
23
Final draft of: Piwek et al. (2007). In: Journal of Pragmatics. Electronically published June 27 2007. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2007.05.001  
Figures
FIGURE 1
[SCHEMA-SIT.EPS AND PHOTO-SET-UP.EPS]
Caption: Schematic overview and photo of the experimental set-up, with B for builder and I
for instructor
FIGURE 2
[DUPLO.EPS]
Caption: Side view of types of blocks from the LEGO DUPLO series used in the experiment
FIGURE 3
[DEMOS-GRAPHS.EPS]
Caption: Results on distribution of Dutch variants of the proximal this (...) (dit/deze (...)) and
distal that (...) (die/dat (...)) over indexical and non-indexical referring acts
FIGURE 4
[GRAPHS.EPS]
Caption: Results on domain accessibility and importance for the Dutch variants of indexical
this (...) (dit/deze (...)) and that (...) (die/dat (...))
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